Loving the mess: navigating diversity and conflict in social values for sustainability by Kenter, J.O. et al.
This is a repository copy of Loving the mess: navigating diversity and conflict in social 
values for sustainability.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/165169/
Version: Published Version
Article:
Kenter, J.O., Raymond, C.M., van Riper, C.J. et al. (20 more authors) (2019) Loving the 
mess: navigating diversity and conflict in social values for sustainability. Sustainability 
Science, 14 (5). pp. 1439-1461. ISSN 1862-4065 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-019-00726-4
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) licence. This licence 
allows you to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon the work, even commercially, as long as you credit the 
authors for the original work. More information and the full terms of the licence here: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Vol.:(0123456789) 
Sustainability Science (2019) 14:1439–1461 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-019-00726-4
SPECIAL FEATURE: OVERVIEW ARTICLE
Loving the mess: navigating diversity and conlict in social values 
for sustainability
Jasper O. Kenter1  · Christopher M. Raymond2,3,4 · Carena J. van Riper5 · Elaine Azzopardi1 · Michelle R. Brear6,7 · 
Fulvia Calcagni8 · Ian Christie9 · Michael Christie10 · Anne Fordham11 · Rachelle K. Gould12 · Christopher D. Ives13 · 
Adam P. Hejnowicz14 · Richard Gunton15 · Andra‑Ioana Horcea‑Milcu16 · Dave Kendal17 · Jakub Kronenberg18 · 
Julian R. Massenberg19 · Seb O’Connor20 · Neil Ravenscroft21 · Andrea Rawluk22 · Ivan J. Raymond23 · 
Jorge Rodríguez‑Morales24 · Samarthia Thankappan1
Received: 17 May 2019 / Accepted: 9 August 2019 / Published online: 24 August 2019 
© The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
This paper concludes a special feature of Sustainability Science that explores a broad range of social value theoretical tradi-
tions, such as religious studies, social psychology, indigenous knowledge, economics, sociology, and philosophy. We intro-
duce a novel transdisciplinary conceptual framework that revolves around concepts of ‘lenses’ and ‘tensions’ to help navigate 
value diversity. First, we consider the notion of lenses: perspectives on value and valuation along diverse dimensions that 
describe what values focus on, how their sociality is envisioned, and what epistemic and procedural assumptions are made. 
We characterise fourteen of such dimensions. This provides a foundation for exploration of seven areas of tension, between: 
(1) the values of individuals vs collectives; (2) values as discrete and held vs embedded and constructed; (3) value as static 
or changeable; (4) valuation as descriptive vs normative and transformative; (5) social vs relational values; (6) diferent 
rationalities and their relation to value integration; (7) degrees of acknowledgment of the role of power in navigating value 
conlicts. In doing so, we embrace the ‘mess’ of diversity, yet also provide a framework to organise this mess and support and 
encourage active transdisciplinary collaboration. We identify key research areas where such collaborations can be harnessed 
for sustainability transformation. Here it is crucial to understand how certain social value lenses are privileged over others 
and build capacity in decision-making for understanding and drawing on multiple value, epistemic and procedural lenses.
Keywords Shared values · Relational values · Environmental values · Knowledge brokering · Epistemology · 
Interdisciplinarity · Ecosystem services · Nature’s contributions to people
Introduction
Social values inquiry draws upon a rich range and depth of 
theoretical traditions, each with its own assumptions related 
to how values are conceptualised, elicited and related to 
other constructs. This paper concludes a Special Feature 
of Sustainability Science that has brought together a broad 
range of these traditions. We seek to build bridges across 
these traditions, considering their diverse social value lenses 
and areas of tension between them. We embrace the ‘mess’ 
of diversity, yet also bring an innovative framing to this mess 
to support and encourage active transdisciplinary collabora-
tion for social values as a key concern of the environmental 
social sciences (Chan et al. 2018, Ives and Kendal 2014; 
Kenter et al. 2014a, 2015, 2016a; Kronenberg 2014; Pascual 
et al. 2017; Parks and Gowdy, 2013; Rawluk et al. 2017; 
Raymond et al. 2014, 2019; Scholte et al. 2015; van Riper 
et al. 2017).
Researchers and practitioners conceptualise social val-
ues in ways that connect to particular understandings of 
the world based on history, culture, geography, experience, 
Theoretical traditions in social values for sustainability
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and embodiment (Williams 2014). This means that no sin-
gle disciplinary framework can fully integrate the many 
understandings of social values. We adopt a post-normal 
view grounded in epistemic pluralism that suggests there 
is no ‘one correct way’ of conceptualising social values; 
each provides a limited perspective to be scrutinised in 
democratic debate and decision-making (Funtowicz and 
Ravetz  1993;  Ainscough et  al. 2018). Post-normal sci-
ence addresses complex, wicked problems, where facts are 
uncertain, stakes are high, and decisions are urgent. Today’s 
deeply challenging environmental sustainability issues pro-
vide a prime example. Here, the choices about what and how 
we research are inherently normative, because all problem 
descriptions partially result from the value lenses through 
which issues are viewed. Diferent lenses give rise to com-
peting knowledge claims, which can be addressed through 
deliberative processes of knowledge co-production that 
extend peer review from expert-only to a transdisciplinary 
community also involving practitioners, policy makers and 
citizens (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993; Strand 2017).
In this paper, we develop a novel transdisciplinary con-
ceptual framework to help navigate the messy reality of 
social values research and practice. Central to this frame-
work is a consideration of social values as lenses of worthi-
ness: lenses of what is considered to matter. Underpinning 
these lenses sit diverse meta-lenses, which explain how val-
ues are conceived and assessed. We highlight two key types 
of meta-lens; the epistemic lens and the procedural lens 
(Fig. 1). We identify fourteen dimensions along which the 
diferent social value lenses and meta-lenses of diverse theo-
retical traditions can be discriminated (Table 1). Armed with 
this framework, we then investigate central areas of tension 
between diferent social value theoretical traditions, identify-
ing key avenues for future research. These tensions emerged 
from a deliberative global expert workshop in York, UK, in 
June 2018 (Box 1; also see Eriksson et al. 2019), to which 
authors representing each of the papers within this Feature 
were invited. The papers were submitted in response to an 
open call for contributions (Raymond et al. 2018). They 
draw on a wide variety of theoretical bases, highlighting the 
importance of social values as a boundary concept (Kenter 
2016a; Steger et al. 2018). 
This is the irst paper to present a comprehensive frame-
work for drawing together knowledge across the wide 
Fig. 1  Social values as lenses on what matters: what is or should be 
important to us, about, in and as the world, with two types of meta-
lenses: the epistemic lens and procedural lens, and the dimensions 
(Table  1) of value associated with the three types of lenses. The 
value lens is depicted in two parts, with broad, transcendental val-
ues guiding speciic, contextual values and their indicators. While 
value lenses and objects of worthiness are depicted as separate enti-
ties, whether they are assumed separable will difer per epistemic lens 
(hence porous boundary of value lens)
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Table 1  Key dimensions of values that serve to diferentiate value lenses and meta-lenses of diverse knowledge traditions, with where applicable reference to the section of this paper where they 
are further discussed in relation to tensions between diferent traditions
Value dimension Key question Description and categories Relevance to transcendental and/
or contextual values and indica-
tors
Further discussion
Value lens
Value concept What does one mean by ‘values’? Transcendental values: broad, overarch-
ing life goals and principles; not asso-
ciated with particular context-speciic 
objects of value
Contextual values: speciic opinions 
about importance, which are dependent 
on a context-speciic object of value 
and hence contextual and attitudinal
Value indicators: an indicator of the 
importance of something speciic (e.g. 
monetary, non-monetary and biophysi-
cal measures, qualitative indicators 
such as a ‘verdict’ from a citizens’ 
jury)
N/A Section “Social value lenses and dimen-
sions of social values”
(Scale of) value provider At what scale are values being 
expressed?
Values are expressed by individuals or 
by ‘social’ or collective valuing agents, 
at the scale of groups, communities, 
cultures or societies as a whole
Both Section “Scales and aggregation: the 
relations between individual and social 
values”
Scale of values What is the scale of the values being 
expressed?
Values can be expressed at the individual 
scale (e.g. how much does something 
beneit an individual?) or at aggregated 
or pre-aggregated social scales such 
as value to society (e.g. how much 
does something beneit the people of 
Mato Grosso?). Values may also be 
expressed at diferent temporal scales 
(e.g. in economics, the net present 
value over a 20-year vs 100-year 
timespan). With regard to transcenden-
tal values, people may have diferent 
values in relation to diferent scales, 
e.g. one might value a varied life for 
oneself, but in relation to society other 
values such as fairness or responsibility 
might be more important
Both Section “Scales and aggregation: the 
relations between individual and social 
values”
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Table 1  (continued)
Value dimension Key question Description and categories Relevance to transcendental and/
or contextual values and indica-
tors
Further discussion
Value intention Who is being regarded with the expres-
sion of values?
People may harbour values with regard 
to themselves (self-regarding values), 
others (other-regarding values, or both 
(reciprocal values). Intention of values 
may difer depending on the role and 
context in which values are expressed 
(e.g. as consumers, in public policy 
contexts, in relationships of care). This 
dimension can apply to interpretations 
of the content of value and to concep-
tual assumptions (e.g. the assump-
tion that values are self-regarding in 
neoclassical economics)
Both Section “Normativity and intention: valua-
tion as descriptive vs normative”
Value frame What frame of the (natural) world does 
the value express?
People live from the world in that they 
gain their sustenance from it, in the 
world as their home and stage of life, 
with the world as the natural backdrop 
of life beyond us, and as the world in 
terms of oneness between people and 
nature, such as experienced through 
kinship, embodiment and spirituality. 
These perspectives can relate to the 
content of values but also to whether 
people–nature relations are conceived 
of through a subject–object dichotomy, 
or a nondual or relational perspective
Both Section “Value justiications and frames: 
shared, social and relational values and 
our relationship with the natural world”
Value justiication How are values justiied? The way that values are justiied, where 
objects of value are substitutable means 
to a human end (instrumental values), 
constitutive of non-substitutable mean-
ingful relationships to people (rela-
tional values), or ends in themselves 
without reference to people as valuers 
(intrinsic values)
Contextual values Section “Value justiications and frames: 
shared, social and relational values and 
our relationship with the natural world”
Epistemic lens
Abstractness What degree of abstraction are values 
conceived of?
Values can be abstract and generalisable 
(e.g. monetary values, the Schwartz 
system of transcendental values), or 
concrete, place-based and idiosyncratic
Both Section “Abstractness and constructed-
ness: social values as discrete and pre-
formed vs embedded and constructed”
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Table 1  (continued)
Value dimension Key question Description and categories Relevance to transcendental and/
or contextual values and indica-
tors
Further discussion
Constructedness Are values pre-formed and stable or situ-
ationally constructed and changeable?
Values can be assumed as: (1) enti-
ties that are ‘held’, ‘pre-formed’ and 
stable, or (2) partially pre-constructed 
as proto-values that are activated and 
become formed in a situation, or (3) 
fully situationally constructed when 
manifested in life and in particular 
valuation contexts, and thus changeable 
according to situations
Both Sections “Abstractness and constructed-
ness: social values as discrete and pre-
formed vs embedded and constructed”, 
“Constructedness and value change: 
social values as stable vs changeable”
Normativity Is assessment of values seen as objective 
and value-neutral, or normative?
Whether the understanding of social 
values is perceived as a critical, eman-
cipatory, and potentially transformative 
afair or as an objective, empirical 
exercise, which may nonetheless 
include the observation of transforma-
tive social values
Both Section “Normativity and intention: valua-
tion as descriptive vs normative”
Rationality How is rationality conceived of? Rather than relating to ethical justiica-
tion, this dimension points to assump-
tions around the validity of values 
with regard to rationality. Examples of 
diferent perspectives include instru-
mental, communicative and bounded 
rationality
Contextual values Section “Value integration and rationali-
ties”
Procedural lens
Elicitation What process is used to elicit values? Values may be elicited through a non-
deliberative process (stated values) 
or through an individual, dialectic or 
social deliberative process (deliberated 
values), or values may be expressed 
through, manifested in and elicited 
from behaviour (revealed, lived and 
embodied values)
Both Section “Abstractness and constructed-
ness: social values as discrete and pre-
formed vs embedded and constructed”
Aggregation How are values aggregated? To achieve values at the social scale they 
may be either pre-aggregated or aggre-
gated from individuals. This dimension 
also points to the meta-values used that 
inform the aggregation procedure or 
function
Contextual values Section “Scales and aggregation: the 
relations between individual and social 
values”
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Table 1  (continued)
Value dimension Key question Description and categories Relevance to transcendental and/
or contextual values and indica-
tors
Further discussion
Integration To what degree are values seen as com-
mensurable and compatible?
The degree to which values can be inte-
grated depends on their (1) commen-
surability—the degree to which values 
can in principle be characterised using 
the same measure, or at least meaning-
fully compared with each other; and 
(2) compatibility, the degree to which 
they practically address the same thing. 
Where values are entirely incommensu-
rable and/or incompatible, integration 
is not possible and values can only be 
considered in parallel
Contextual values Section “Value integration and rationali-
ties”
Power How are conlict, power and justice 
considered in the articulation and elici-
tation of value?
The degree to which researchers and 
practitioners consider the institutional 
nature of value conlicts—conlicts 
between values, as well as concepts 
of values and their underpinning 
epistemic assumptions—and account 
for diferentials in power associated 
with multiple values and value lenses 
and meta-lenses. Values may be treated 
as power-neutral or as relecting 
power diferences. This dimension 
also highlights the degree to which 
diferent forms of justice (distributive, 
retributive, recognition, procedural) are 
considered in dealing with conlict
Both Section “Values, conlict and power”
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range of traditions that consider social values of sustain-
ability, from more realist to more relativist, from positivist 
to diverse interpretivist and critical approaches. However, 
rather than rehash well-known spectra of ontology and epis-
temology, we identify speciic tensions to more precisely 
investigate key pinch points in relation to social values and 
valuation. While we focus on environmental sustainability, 
our contribution may also beneit other ields where social 
values are a key concern, such as energy and health.
The exploration of tensions between theoretical tradi-
tions is an opportunity for personal and collective growth 
and a means for advancing scholarship, not least because 
it highlights diferent understandings of and approaches to 
social values that may not be self-evident when those from 
diferent backgrounds collaborate. Tensions and lenses need 
to be explicitly and rigorously considered if the goal is to 
incorporate a diversity of worldviews into environmental 
decision-making, as proposed by, for example, the Inter-
governmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services (IPBES) (Pascual et al. 2017; Díaz et al. 
2018; Christie et al. 2019b). The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change has long been heavily dominated by natu-
ral science worldviews, but also here there are demands for 
a more diverse knowledge base and challenging implicit 
social value lenses (Hulme 2011; Ford et al. 2016). Through 
a mutual recognition of diferences, viewing sustainability 
issues through diferent lenses of social values provides a 
richer and more comprehensive picture and can ofer a more 
inclusive and more relevant value-evidence basis for sustain-
ability transformation. Thus, we clarify issues at the frontier 
of social values for sustainability in the light of these ten-
sions, providing a forward-looking and constructive agenda 
for transdisciplinary engagement with sustainability science.
Box 1: Deliberation process within the author team
An open call for Special Feature abstracts was publicised 
in February 2018 in Sustainability Science (Raymond et al. 
2018). Forty-seven submissions were received, of which 18 
were selected by the co-editors (CR, AR, CvR, DK, JK) 
based on criteria including academic quality from peer 
review of abstracts, disciplinary and geographic diversity, 
and gender balance. An author from each paper was invited 
to attend a workshop at the University of York, UK, funded 
by the Valuing Nature Programme. The goals of the work-
shop were to identify linkages across papers, facilitate delib-
eration on broader social values knowledge across diverse 
disciplines, and synthesise this new knowledge in a collec-
tive article. A diversity of perspectives were represented, 
including environmental science and ecology, human geog-
raphy, sociology, psychology, ecological and mainstream 
economics, anthropology, philosophy, and business and 
religious studies.
The irst day of the workshop involved ive sessions, each 
containing three paper presentations and 45 min discussion. 
At the conclusion of each session, workshop participants 
added their individual relections to an online interface. The 
co-editors distilled these insights into ive sets of topics: 
(1) value scales and hierarchies; (2) integration, plurality 
and conlict; (3) values and value-activation; (4) power and 
value change; and (5) overall conceptualisation of social 
values. The following day, participants deliberated on these 
topic sets in small subgroups over the course of two dis-
cussion sessions facilitated by the co-editors, allowing each 
participant to engage with two sets in detail and learn from 
the group’s insights. Each subgroup focused on identify-
ing areas of tension between diferent knowledge traditions 
and their lenses, and future directions for research. A inal 
plenary session further reined tensions, and identiied key 
conclusions and cross-linkages. Following the workshop, 
reports from each subgroup were prepared, which were 
further elaborated into mini-articles by subgroups of the 
authors through collaboration and discussion via email and 
videoconference. The lead author (JK) and co-editors then 
iteratively reorganised the partially overlapping content of 
these outputs into the structure of lenses, dimensions and 
tensions as presented here.
Social value lenses and dimensions of social 
values
There are many understandings of social values. Central 
understandings include values as overarching principles, 
values pertaining to a common good or society as a whole, 
and values that become shared through processes of sociali-
sation, including deliberation and internalisation (Kenter 
et al. 2015; van Riper et al. 2018; Ishihara 2018). Diverse 
knowledge and appraisal traditions each harbour one or more 
social value lenses. These lenses articulate both what values 
are focused upon and how their sociality is envisioned. The 
lenses of diverse traditions can be characterised and difer-
entiated along multiple dimensions of social values, such as 
the scale of values or the process by which they are elicited 
(Table 1). For example, a research tradition may focus on 
values at the societal scale, expressed by a social unit larger 
than an individual (e.g. a local community) and/or through 
a social process (e.g. a group workshop). In addition, dif-
ferent traditions harbour meta-lenses (Fig. 1), comprising 
speciic theories and bodies of scientiic or local and indig-
enous knowledge that articulate diferent perspectives on 
social valuation, with their own epistemologies and explicit 
or implicit meta-values: values about values, for example, 
about how values should be aggregated (Kenter et al. 2016a). 
Meta-lenses thus frame the social perspective and position 
of the viewer with respect to how social values and their 
1446 Sustainability Science (2019) 14:1439–1461
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dynamics are perceived and expressed. We consider social 
value lenses and meta-lenses to be a dynamic medium of 
perception, articulation and understanding through which 
the world is interpreted and evaluated: they are therefore 
open, relexive and responsive, and not ixed, unidirectional 
or unchanging.
Meta-lenses also help us understand how social value 
lenses are associated with and applied to diferent purposes, 
exempliied by the diverse papers in this Special Feature. 
Some meta-lenses focus on understanding relations between 
values and behaviour (van Riper et al. 2019), others are 
geared towards value formation and co-construction (Kenter 
et al. 2016c; Calcagni et al. 2019); lived values (Brear and 
Mbonane 2019); values embedded in cultural institutions 
(Gould et al. 2019; Ives and Kidwell 2019; Christie et al. 
2019b); or value-awareness and activation in relation to 
wellbeing and sustainability (Raymond and Raymond 2019). 
Other meta-lenses are critical and emancipatory (O’Connor 
and Kenter 2019; Ravenscroft 2019). Finally, some are them-
selves associated with studying how meta-lenses are adopted 
in valuation institutions (Rawluk et al. 2019; Horcea-Milcu 
et al. 2019; Massenberg 2019).
While a complete discussion of the knowledge paradigms 
embedded within difering meta-lenses of diverse tradi-
tions is beyond the scope of this paper, the teleological or 
purposeful nature of social value lenses can be explained by 
two key types of meta-lens: the epistemic and procedural 
meta-lens (Fig. 1), or, for brevity, simply epistemic lens and 
procedural lens. The epistemic lens considers how we har-
bour, create and know ‘value’, as well as the philosophical 
orientation of knowledge traditions that guides researchers’ 
social value lenses. The procedural lens describes the types 
of processes used to attain and explain social values.
To help understand similarities and tensions between 
diferent social value traditions, we consider a range of 
dimensions of their value, epistemic and procedural lenses 
(Table 1). Here we build on foundational work by Kenter 
et al. (2014a, 2015), who developed a framework for difer-
entiating between types of social values according to how 
they have been conceived in diferent traditions. At the basis 
of this lies diferentiation between broad, transcendental and 
speciic, contextual values and their indicators. Transcen-
dental values are broad notions of what is important in life; 
they are not attached to a context-speciic object of value 
and serve to guide speciic, contextual values. For example, 
a broad desire for harmony with nature might lead us to 
express context-speciic opinions of value around conserv-
ing a particular habitat, which may be assessed in terms of 
quantitative or qualitative indicators through some form of 
valuation. It is important to note that transcendental values, 
while they transcend the speciic contexts where we ascribe 
importance to particular things, are by deinition generalis-
able or divorced from cultural contexts more broadly. For 
example, what constitutes harmony, nature, and harmony 
with nature might be conceived of quite diferently between 
diferent cultures. In practice, transcendental and contextual 
values can be closely entwined, particularly where transcen-
dental values are strongly embedded in particular relation-
ships (including with non-humans) and not meaningfully 
separable from the importance ascribed to those relation-
ships (Gould et al. 2019).
This nomenclature extended research by Rokeach (1973) 
that diferentiated ‘held’ values (i.e. guiding principles and 
life goals) and ‘assigned’ values (i.e. opinions on the values 
of particulars), where the irst were thought to predict the 
latter, both through the process of deduction and a relational 
realm of felt experiences (Schroeder 2013). However, Kenter 
et al. (2015) noted that opinions on the values of particu-
lars could semantically be both held and assigned, and that 
values might thirdly refer to measures and other indicators. 
Further, the terms held and assigned have come to be asso-
ciated with a particular knowledge tradition, which makes 
implicit epistemic assumptions that values are pre-formed, 
discretely observable mental entities. These assumptions are 
shared by some but contested by other traditions (we will 
discuss this further in the next section). Thus, transcenden-
tal and contextual should not just be seen as new terms for 
Rokeach’s old concepts, but along with indicators as a way 
to distinguish between the three main meanings of the word 
value that does not seek to prejudice towards the implicit 
epistemic assumptions associated with the idea that values 
can be held or assigned.
Kenter et al. (2015) also discriminated between diferent 
types of shared and social values along dimensions of value 
provider, scale, intention, and elicitation process. To pro-
vide for a framework that can tackle knowledge of a broader 
multidisciplinary nature, such as relected in this feature and 
other important recent knowledge developments in the ield 
(e.g. a special issue of Current Opinion on Environmental 
Sustainability on relational values; Chan et al. 2018), we 
add further dimensions and organise them in relation to the 
value, epistemic and procedural lenses (Fig. 1; Table 1). We 
add two dimensions associated with the value lens: value 
frame and value justification. These dimensions categorise 
values in relation to framings of how the world matters to 
people and diferentiate between intrinsic, relational and 
instrumental values. Within the epistemic lens, abstractness, 
constructedness, normativity and rationality denote whether 
values are considered abstract or place-based, pre-formed or 
constructed, descriptive or normative, and which conception 
of rationality justiies them. Associated with the procedural 
lens, the closely related dimensions of aggregation, inte-
gration and power denote diferences in the way that value 
plurality and conlict are perceived and managed.
As an example of the relations among value, epis-
temic and procedural lenses, and some of their associated 
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dimensions, in this feature O’Connor and Kenter (2019) 
investigated a particular type of social values, ‘articulated 
intrinsic values’, focusing on marine ecosystems employ-
ing ethnographic stakeholder interviews. The social value 
lens was the worthiness of the ‘more-than-human’ world, 
relecting other-regarding values on the dimension of inten-
tion, individual and communal values in terms of scale, and 
intrinsic values in relation to justiication (Table 1). The 
underpinning epistemic lens in this research was interpre-
tivist and perspectivist. This lens characterised values as 
place-based and situationally constructed on the dimensions 
of abstractness and constructedness, and the dimension of 
normativity highlights an epistemic lens that seeks to eman-
cipate the more-than-human world. The authors deployed 
a procedural lens along the dimensions of elicitation and 
aggregation that highlighted the purpose of the exercise as 
feeding into a deliberative democratic process that should be 
used to weigh and aggregate the diferent values expressed. 
The procedural lens thus emphasised meta-values of par-
ticipation, deliberation and, in relation to the power dimen-
sion, fairness in terms of procedural and recognition justice, 
through which the social value lens of articulated intrinsic 
values was considered.
We do not claim this new set of dimensions fully and 
inally articulates all possible lenses and meta-lenses across 
the vast diversity of social values literature. However, it 
relects a substantial extension and evolution of understand-
ing from Kenter et al. (2015), which was largely grounded 
in ecological economics, to a much more comprehensive 
interdisciplinary underpinning.
Combining and comparing social values across theoreti-
cal traditions can lead to tensions, because these traditions 
utilise diferent social value lenses and meta-lenses relect-
ing diferences in the way values are conceived, elicited and 
applied. Following Goldstein (2015), a commitment to con-
ceptual and theoretical openness in interdisciplinary teams 
generates conceptual tension at various levels, to diverse 
degrees, and to variable efects. In turn, tension and conlict 
open up established theories and concepts for dialogue and 
revision. Lenses and tensions are closely related, because 
lenses can be seen as a key source of tension, or conversely, 
are themselves characterised by one’s position in areas of 
tension. Thus, the notion of lenses and tensions across dif-
ferent dimensions provide a useful means of scafolding to 
‘frame the mess’ of diversity in the broad ield of social 
values.
Tensions can arise at the level of the content of values, 
value lenses, and meta-lenses. For example, a typical con-
lict between pro-development and pro-conservation values 
is not just a matter of valuing diferent things, as what values 
are included will be diferent depending on the dimensions 
of the value lens used, such as its scale (e.g. individual, 
communal, societal), and on the epistemic and procedural 
meta-lens underpinning it, such as in terms of what value 
justiications are considered and how questions of value 
aggregation and power are addressed.
We discuss seven key areas of tension. We focus on the 
following, gradually shifting emphasis from ontology of 
social values to their application: (1) social values as aggre-
gated from the individual scale vs being pre-aggregated at 
a social scale (related to the value provider, scale of values, 
and aggregation dimensions); (2) social values as discrete, 
pre-formed and held vs being embedded, implicit, and con-
structed through their manifestation in deliberation and 
action; and (3) values as static or changeable (both related to 
the constructedness dimension); (4) social values through a 
descriptive vs normative lens (intention and normativity); (5) 
the relations between social, shared, relational, intrinsic and 
instrumental values (frame and justification dimensions); (6) 
tensions relating to value integration; and (7) tensions in the 
degree to which power is acknowledged in navigating value 
conlict (power dimension).
Tensions in the theory and practice of social 
values
Scales and aggregation: the relations 
between individual and social values
The irst area of tension arises from a basic question: what 
makes social values social? Although interpreted difer-
ently, essentially the idea of values being social relates to 
society. This raises the question of how society and its val-
ues are represented, particularly whether societal values are 
considered an independent construct or an aggregation of 
individual values. Thus far, most lenses have either focused 
on individualistic or collective indicators, and there is only 
limited understanding of the relations between them (Kenter 
et al. 2014a).
Some social values cannot be reduced to the individual 
scale of expression. As an example, take the UK Marine 
Policy Statement, which formalises a “shared vision” of 
“clean, healthy, safe, productive and biologically diverse 
oceans and seas”.1 This signiies shared social values across 
value lens dimensions: the statement was made by govern-
ments to represent society as a whole and express transcen-
dental values at the social scale, established through a social 
process. Individuals are socialised: therefore all individual 
values relect social values to a certain degree (Kenter et al. 
2015). Individuals may also experience, represent and enact 
shared values such as expressed by the policy statement 
1 https ://www.gov.uk/gover nment /publi catio ns/uk-marin e-polic 
y-state ment.
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above. However, how can individual values be aggregated 
to form social values?
The relationship between individual values and social 
values at a societal scale (i.e. as value to society in terms 
of contextual values, and as values in relation to society 
in terms of transcendental values), can be thought of in at 
least ive ways, which inform diferent social value lenses 
(Fig. 2). In Fig. 2a, at the contextual value level, the aggre-
gate of individual and social values are diferent but may 
overlap, while at the transcendental level people may express 
multiple sets of potentially overlapping and clashing val-
ues (e.g. consumer values vs citizen values; Kenyon et al. 
2001). The second perspective is that of a nested diagram 
(Fig. 2b), which indicates that any method of aggregating 
values, whether through analytical approaches or delibera-
tive processes, is bound to exclude some, typically because 
of power relations (Ernstson 2013; Hockley 2014; Orchard-
Webb et  al. 2016). Under this model, social values are 
always a subset of the pool of individual values and rarely 
approximate the totality of pooled values. The third and 
fourth igures (Fig. 2c, d) depict a causal relationship, where 
either social values predict individual ones or vice versa 
(e.g. van Riper et al. 2019). This relects the view that indi-
viduals represent their society, but consider it through their 
Fig. 2  Diferent ways of conceiving the relation between social val-
ues (as value to society in terms of contextual values, and as values 
in relation to society in terms of transcendental values) and individual 
values: as a distinct but overlapping sets of values; b social values as 
a subset of the aggregate of individual values; c social values as (par-
tially) predicting individual values; d social values as (partially) pre-
dicted by individual values; and e social values in dynamic interplay 
with individual values
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individual perceptions and experiences. The ifth (Fig. 2e) 
is a dynamic view of causal relationships, whereby indi-
vidual values and shared social values can be seen as situ-
ated within a dynamic interplay where values ‘transfer’ from 
various social to individual provider levels and vice versa 
(e.g. Fordham and Robinson 2019).
Further research on the interrelations between individual 
and social values is needed within and across each of the 
ive models in Fig. 2. Also, comparative research between 
the overlapping, nested, causal, and dynamic perspectives 
will be of particular value in considering what factors inlu-
ence the diference between (aggregate) individual and (pre-
aggregated) social values, and how values transfer between 
these levels. Moreover, the use of more than one model will 
likely provide added insight into complex and contested 
issues, as investigation of shared values is particularly sali-
ent in situations of social conlict and disagreement among 
interest groups (Kenter et al. 2014b). All of these models 
are sensitive to the diferences between aggregate individual 
and social values, and as such, it is important for policy 
and practice to recognise what might inluence degrees of 
diference, and how these diferences relate with associated 
lenses used to assess values. Greater understanding of the 
diferences between aggregated individual values and social 
values will also enable researchers to identify appropriate 
methods for establishing a more comprehensive perspective.
Extending the ontological tension between (aggregated) 
individual and social values, we further complicate this 
relationship and distinguish social values across multiple 
levels of value providers. Relationships between individual 
and social values function within complex systems can be 
organised hierarchically (van Riper et al. 2018). Previous 
research has identiied and grouped values provided at the 
individual, group (extended) community, and whole culture 
and society levels (Manfredo et al. 2014; Kenter et al. 2015) 
that accommodate interactions within these hierarchies. In 
line with arguments that values ‘scale up’ to higher lev-
els (Kendal and Raymond, 2019), the values expressed by 
groups are in part an aggregate of individuals’ values but 
may also be entirely new ‘emergent’ phenomena (Fig. 3). In 
addition to this ontological tension between individual val-
ues and values of larger social units, there are practical ten-
sions between values that exist at diferent provider levels. 
This tension is generated by value hierarchies in inding sus-
tainability solutions, as well as processes for aligning values 
across multiple scales such as the need for decision-making 
processes to prioritise between the values of smaller versus 
larger collectives. This is further complicated by diferent 
procedural lenses on the commensurability and compatibil-
ity of values and lenses (see section “Constructedness and 
value change: social values as stable vs changeable”), and on 
how to navigate conlict and address power issues (see sec-
tion “Value integration and rationalities”).
We distinguish two mechanisms by which values are 
transferred between levels. The irst is socialisation, and it 
occurs over extended periods of time (Ishihara 2018) as well 
as when values are formed in shorter-term social processes, 
such as group deliberation (Kenter et al. 2016c; Kendal and 
Raymond 2019). The values that emerge from socialisation 
can be solidiied through social learning and social norms 
that regulate practices within a collective (Irvine et  al. 
2016). The second is internalisation. Over time, individuals 
observe interpersonal dynamics and adjust their orientations 
to align with a group (Calcagni et al. 2019, van Riper et al. 
2018). This is grounded in personal relections and intra-
individual deliberation. Together, these mechanisms can 
yield changes in systemic understanding of others’ values, 
improved capacity for individuals to recognise their own ori-
entations, and knowledge of why changes in values occur at 
diferent levels of social organisation (Kenter et al. 2016c).
Fig. 3  Conceptual model showing there are multiple levels of 
value  providers—including individual, group, community, and cul-
tural—that have diferent conigurations of individual and aggre-
gated values as relected by the multi-coloured units within each 
sphere. The diferent levels interact through feedbacks that amplify 
or dampen the relationships of values and the boundaries between 
them, which are permeable. Internalisation and socialisation are the 
key processes that facilitate the scaling up and down of values within 
hierarchies of value providers
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Future research should explore how values are shifted 
when moving across diferent hierarchical levels. This is par-
ticularly relevant in light of sustainability transitions because 
the scaling up and down of values relects the continuously 
changing conditions in society and ofers an opportunity to 
ensure the incorporation of multiple values into decision-
making (also see Fordham and Robinson 2019).
Abstractness and constructedness: social 
values as discrete and pre‑formed vs embedded 
and constructed
An in important tension between diferent epistemic lenses 
revolves around whether values are believed to exist as dis-
crete entities, pre-formed and held by people, or as only 
coming into existence when manifested, including in delib-
eration (Ravenscroft 2019) and as ‘lived values’ in indi-
vidual and collective behaviour (Brear and Mbonane 2019, 
Gould et al. 2019). In terms of contextual values, valuation 
researchers have pointed out these are frequently poorly 
formed in unfamiliar environmental contexts (Jobstvogt 
et al. 2014a, b; Urama and Hodge 2006). However, there is 
also a tension in the conception of transcendental values as: 
(1) held as, (a) relatively singular and stable across a human 
lifespan, or (b) multiple sets of contextually activated values; 
or (2) not held but constructed and manifested in response 
to individual, group and social–ecological context. This ten-
sion also relates to the dimension of abstractness associated 
with epistemic lenses and discussed in more detail by Raw-
luk et al. (2019). This dimension clariies whether values 
are seen to be: (1) distinctly isolated as an abstract, discrete 
entity (e.g. in this feature van Riper et al. 2019; Christie 
et al. 2019a); or (2) not abstractable from broader cultural 
constructs such as worldviews, cosmologies or narratives, 
and, in relation to speciic values, places, without losing 
meaning (e.g. in this feature Gould et al. 2019; O’Connor 
and Kenter 2019; Ives and Kidwell 2019).
The tension between epistemic lenses that see social val-
ues as abstract, discrete and held vs embedded, situation-
ally constructed and manifested has important implications 
for social valuation: from the irst perspective, associated 
with for example social psychology, conventional econom-
ics and public participation GIS, values are considered as 
self-existing mental entities that can be isolated and interro-
gated. In other perspectives, associated with humanities and 
deliberative ecological economics, values are understood as 
embedded in cultural and institutional contexts. Here the 
language of value ‘capture’ becomes inappropriate (Raven-
scroft 2019). These latter perspectives are also less likely to 
see values within a power vacuum, rather considering them 
as part of an institutional setup shaped by discursive struc-
tures of power and knowledge—we will return to questions 
of power in “Value integration and rationalities”.
Some synthesis between the two positions is possible 
through the concept of proto-values (Kenter et al. 2016a), 
where people neither hold fully formed values nor are they 
an evaluative tabula rasa. Proto-values mediate between the 
transcendental (broad) and contextual (speciic) concepts of 
values, and between the abstract and pre-formed and con-
structed and situated. They are not fully formed values but 
exist as a broad value-inclination or attitude that becomes 
more moulded by and embedded within context through a 
key set of institutional and contextual process factors, which 
can include the lens and meta-lenses of the particular social 
values tradition. Proto-values provide an avenue for allowing 
some generalisation, whilst acknowledging valuation as a 
process of value formation that is highly context-dependent. 
However, the concept is in need of further development and 
empirical exploration.
Constructedness and embeddedness also raise questions 
about the social and spatiotemporal scales within which 
this embedding is situated. Scales inluence how research 
is conducted and looking through difering spatiotemporal 
value lenses can yield conlicting perspectives on sustain-
ability solutions (Gunton et al. 2014). Future research should 
be sensitive to the efects of spatial and temporal variation 
in values and focus on mechanisms that can bridge mul-
tiple spatiotemporal lenses. Deliberative and interpretive 
participatory mapping exercises could consider how spa-
tially explicit social values are culturally and institutionally 
embedded. This approach could also provide insight on how 
values map onto the geographies of relevant environmental 
conditions, evaluate how group deliberation can synthesise 
values across a range of spatiotemporal scales, and reconcile 
mismatches between scales of people’s values and ecosystem 
processes. Furthermore, the degree to which values are seen 
as isolatable from the contexts of place, time and culture 
will inluence the types of interventions that are considered: 
whether it makes sense to develop generalised interventions 
focused speciically on encouraging pro-environmental val-
ues, or whether they should be highly situated and place-
based, or focus on a value formation process that is geared 
towards activation and translation of proto-values to par-
ticular contexts.
Constructedness and value change: social values 
as stable vs changeable
A further tension related to the epistemic dimension of con-
structedness is whether values are perceived as stable or 
changeable. This is of particular importance and increasing 
debate within the sustainability ield, because the degree to 
which values are pre-formed and stable will more generally 
determine the usefulness of interventions targeting values 
(e.g. mindfulness or targeted deliberations) as a strategy 
for sustainability transformation. This debate within the 
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context of pro-environmental value and behaviour change 
is most relevant to consideration of transcendental values. 
These are generally seen as more stable than contextual val-
ues (Schwartz et al. 2012), yet they are expressed to difer-
ent degrees depending on the salience of issues (Trope and 
Liberman 2010) and centrality to the evaluator’s identity 
(Stets and Burke 2000). Both across and within traditions 
such as social psychology, deliberative ecological eco-
nomics and sociology, diferent procedural and epistemic 
lenses conlict in terms of their perceptions on how easily 
transcendental values can be changed (e.g. Manfredo et al. 
2017; Raymond and Kenter 2016; Everard et al. 2016; Ives 
and Fischer 2017). Others argue that a notable gap between 
transcendental values and actions (Kollmuss and Agyeman 
2002) makes this mission irrelevant. That is, while values 
may activate certain behavioural intentions, constraints 
posed by people’s environments limit their expression. In 
contrast, the positive psychology literature (Raymond and 
Raymond 2019) does not focus on value change but instead 
on individuals acting congruently with their values, with 
congruence associated with higher wellbeing and psycho-
logical health. This literature brings a strong focus to how 
values are operationalised and behaviourally manifested 
in diferent contexts and to awareness raising processes to 
deliberate on and express values within context, including 
speciic decision-making processes. Drawing on Bardi and 
Goodwin (2011), awareness raising represents a ‘priming’ 
process for value change and/or expression. Awareness 
raising processes can be considered across two pathways: 
a healthy values pathway whereby certain value types are 
associated with healthy outcomes for the individual, and 
a value activation pathway which considers whether self-
identiied values are congruently expressed (Raymond and 
Raymond 2019). Mindfulness, operationalised as (1) aware-
ness (‘what is mindfulness’), (2) skill (mindful awareness 
of values in decision-making) and (3) mindset (mindful 
orientation), is a way to promote wellbeing and sustainable 
behaviour through the pathway of value activation. Mindful-
ness has thus emerged as an important process variable to 
understand the elicitation and expression of values (Wamsler 
et al. 2018) with clear relevance for sustainability science. 
However, thus far the value lens of positive psychology has 
almost solely focused on internalisation with individuals. To 
act as mediator for value change at the communal, cultural 
and societal level, mindfulness also needs to be linked to 
socialisation processes.
Sustainability science is increasingly focused on the 
causes and efects of change, and values can be conceived 
of as both a driver and an outcome of that change. Societal 
values form the foundation of institutional rules and knowl-
edge systems that are part of managing and governing natu-
ral resources (Gavin et al. 2018). At the same time, complex 
environmental change such as climate change can become 
a catalyst for changes in values (O’Brien and Wolf 2010). 
Crisis triggered by natural hazards shortens even more the 
feedbacks between values as drivers and outcomes. As such, 
the opportunity space for responses to risks is delineated and 
shaped by deliberated, reconciled societal, communal and 
group values, but at the same time, crisis may be the most 
rapid trigger for radical changes in our principles and life 
goals, and this in turn is likely to afect contextual values. 
When the consequences of environmental changes become 
evident for people, they may become more aware of the 
diverse values of nature, compared to ‘normal’ times. Cri-
ses of natural resources or climate change thus can become 
opportunities to form and (re-)connect to shared values 
of nature if the focus is on how to think and act together 
towards these values.
Further research is needed that considers to what degree 
and how rapidly transcendental values can change, why a 
focus on contextual factors and values may not be suicient 
(IPBES 2019), how does value change ‘ripple out’ (Everard 
et al. 2016) to the societal and cultural level, what interven-
tions are most efective at achieving such change, and to 
what degree value change acts as a precursor to or an efect 
of changing behaviour. There is also a need for interdisci-
plinary scholars to reconcile the approaches of value change 
and value congruence, notably if wellbeing as a construct is 
considered as much a process as an outcome, and to relate 
individualistic processes such as mindfulness more strongly 
to social values, socialisation processes and social outcomes.
Normativity and intention: valuation as descriptive 
vs normative
The next tension relates to whether the formation and 
understanding of social values is perceived as teleologi-
cally normative: a critical, emancipatory, and potentially 
transformative afair (e.g. in this feature O’Connor and 
Kenter 2019; Brear and Mbonane 2019; Horcea-Milcu 
et al. 2019; Ravenscroft 2019), or as descriptive: an objec-
tive, empirical exercise (e.g. Christie et al. 2019b; Raymond 
and Raymond 2019), which nonetheless may include the 
observation of transformative social values (e.g. Fordham 
and Robinson 2019). Through a critical meta-lens, (shared) 
social values can be seen as a (shared) understanding of 
the common good. The ethical and political considerations 
of this critical meta-lens beg questions about how conclu-
sions are drawn and knowledge might be advanced, and to 
what degree deliberation should be grounded in democratic 
ideals (Ravenscroft 2019) or derived from people’s lived 
experience (Brear and Mbonane 2019). However, this raises 
important questions of procedural and recognition justice, 
of what, and whose perspectives should be included within 
consideration of the common good and by what criteria 
1452 Sustainability Science (2019) 14:1439–1461
1 3
this can be validated. Though the emancipatory tradition 
typically focuses on maximising inclusion (Lo and Spash 
2012; Orchard-Webb et al. 2016), this does not mean that 
all individual values should be included or aggregated, for 
example where they do not serve society as a whole (Sagof 
1986), or are incompatible with sustainability (Menzel and 
Green 2013).
Interestingly, a similar tension between descriptive and 
normative exists with regard to relational values, that can be 
discussed as a matter for observation (Calcagni et al. 2019; 
Klain et al. 2017) or an agenda for inclusion and emancipa-
tion of non-scientiic knowledge (Gould et al. 2019; Stål-
hammar and Thorén 2019). However, while relational values 
are not generally put forward as ‘better’ than instrumental 
ones, the normative tradition clearly advocates social values 
as more desirable than individual ones for the purpose of 
decision-making, as long as the conditions of procedural 
and recognition justice are reasonably satisied (Howarth and 
Wilson 2006; Irvine et al. 2016; Kenter et al. 2016b; Raven-
scroft 2019; Zografos and Howarth 2010). This relates also 
to the dimension of intention on the value lens: when valua-
tion is seen as transformative, it is unlikely that this purpose 
seeks values to be more self-regarding. Rather, social values 
are seen as oriented towards more other-regarding perspec-
tives and the consideration of society as a whole (and which 
may also include non-humans; O’Connor and Kenter 2019; 
Gould et al. 2019). From this perspective, the individual 
self-regarding preferences associated with market decisions 
should not be transferred to the social value domain of the 
group, or public policy (Mauss 1954; Lo and Spash 2012; 
Kenter et al. 2014a; Irvine et al. 2016; Ravenscroft 2019). 
As Sagof (1986, p303) put it: “Why is it good in itself that a 
person who wants a Mercedes succeed in getting one? Hav-
ing a preference is a reason for the person who has it to try to 
satisfy it. Why should it be a goal of public policy, however 
to satisfy that preference?”.
However, the clear division of self-regarding consumer vs 
more other-regarding citizen values is seen by some lenses 
as an abstraction, such as in care ethics and relational axi-
ology, where identities and values are seen as deined by 
embodied, reciprocal relationships and values, and where 
self and other are not discretely separated as diferent objects 
of regard (Held 2006; Muraca 2016; Gould et al. 2019).
The tension relating to the intention and normativity 
dimensions of value and epistemic lenses can in part be 
resolved by recognising that diferent positions along these 
dimensions typically correspond to diferences at value lens 
dimensions of scale, provider and concept and the proce-
dural lens dimension of process. Normative meta-lenses 
are particularly focused on shared and social values in the 
sense of value to society, formed through a shared social 
process, and/or expressed by non-individual value-provid-
ers. Transcendental values, particularly those relating to 
environmental sustainability and social justice, are impor-
tant in the sense that they are seen as ends that steer those 
processes and that play an important role in contextual value 
formation, but they are not generally the primary objective 
of study. There is a goal of providing evidence for inter-
ventions, but the social valuation itself can also be seen 
as an intervention to transform values and/or behaviour 
or challenge existing institutions. In contrast, descriptive 
meta-lenses more typically focus on either social values as 
aggregated individual values, or social values in the sense of 
transcendental values, mostly by individual providers, and 
the relations between transcendental and contextual values 
and behaviour to provide evidence for exogenous interven-
tions. In a small number of studies, the two approaches have 
been successfully combined where descriptive approaches 
inform or are integrated with consequent deliberation on the 
common good (Kenter 2016b; Kenter et al. 2016b; Raymond 
et al. 2014; Raymond and Kenter 2016; Borsuk et al. 2019). 
Martino et al. (2019) illustrate that the need for descrip-
tive vs normative valuation also depends on endogenous 
characteristics of diferent environmental goods, and how 
these characteristics interact with social institutions. Fur-
ther research may consider more deeply when descriptive 
and normative approaches are most appropriate and when 
combinations of both add particular value. There is also a 
need for more explicit evaluations of recognition and proce-
dural justice in critical social valuation, and to what degree, 
and under which conditions, the transformative objectives 
of social valuations are met.
Value justiications and frames: shared, social 
and relational values and our relationship 
with the natural world
In recent years, the increasing emphasis on social values 
within the sustainability ield has arisen in parallel with 
increased attention to relational values, particularly with 
regard to ecosystem assessment (e.g. Chan et al. 2018, 
2016; Muraca 2016; IPBES 2016; Christie et al. 2019b). 
Several contributions to this feature have considered rela-
tional values and their relation with shared, social, instru-
mental and intrinsic values (Calcagni et al. 2019; Stålham-
mar and Thorén 2019; Gould et al. 2019; O’Connor and 
Kenter 2019). Both relational and social strands of think-
ing evolved, at least in relation to ecosystem assessment 
and valuation, from increasing recognition of the limita-
tions of mainstream economic valuation and its instrumen-
tal value assumptions. This opened up a fuzzy ield of non-
monetary, social, cultural or sociocultural values, largely 
associated with the study of cultural ecosystem services 
and to some degree indigenous and local knowledge sys-
tems, that used a wide array of methods but without much 
attention to underpinning value, epistemic and procedural 
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lenses (Raymond et al. 2014; Scholte et al. 2015). Two 
interventions signalled diferent directions: Kenter et al. 
(2014a, 2015) focused on clarifying the concept, dimen-
sions and types of shared and social values as critiques of 
the pre-formed, individualist and self-regarding assump-
tions of mainstream valuation. While shared and social 
values were considered largely synonymous, social values 
tended to emphasise social scales whereas shared values 
tended to refer to social value providers and the outcomes 
of collective value formation. This discourse (further 
developed in a special issue of Ecosystem Services, 
October 2016, mostly by authors associated with the UK 
National Ecosystem Assessment follow-on; Kenter, 2016a) 
articulates strongly the social nature of values and the long 
and short-term processes for socialisation and internalisa-
tion of values, with particular regard for integrating delib-
erative and interpretive approaches as a preferred method-
ology for assessing shared values (e.g. Orchard-Webb et al. 
2016; Edwards et al. 2016; Ranger et al. 2016). Relational 
values, in the sense of values pertaining to meaningful, 
non-substitutable relationships between people and their 
environment, were considered, but primarily from a per-
spective of their shared-ness within groups, communities, 
cultures and societies.
In a diferent intervention, Chan et al. (2016) deined rela-
tional values as preferences, principles, and virtues pertain-
ing to relationships. They argue that in practice the instru-
mental and intrinsic value concepts central to environmental 
ethics did not capture what matters most to people, and that 
a distinct bridging concept was needed. This concept has 
since been elevated to central importance in IPBES (Pascual 
et al. 2017; Díaz et al. 2018; Christie et al. 2019b). As with 
social values, the scope of relational values is broad and 
fuzzy (Stålhammar and Thorén 2019). Relational values can 
refer to the ethical nature of value as being anthropocentric, 
yet non-instrumental, in the sense of not open to trade-of 
(Díaz et al. 2015; Himes and Muraca 2018); or it can relate 
to the content of transcendental or contextual values as 
pertaining to relationships (Klain et al. 2017; Gould et al. 
2019); or it can refer to a ‘relational ield’ as the source of 
value, rather than the value object or subject (Muraca 2011, 
2016). Importantly, while the dichotomy between intrinsic 
and instrumental is typically conveyed as a major tension in 
environmental debates, Stålhammar and Thorén (2019) point 
out that these value types are somewhat caricatured, and that 
environmental ethics has long had more nuanced interpreta-
tions of instrumental and intrinsic values that are inclusive 
of relational value justiications (e.g. Naess 1973). As such, 
the ambition of the relational intervention is perhaps more 
pragmatic than theoretical, in advancing recognition of the 
relational nature of how people talk and think about values 
(Chan et al. 2018).
Relational values as a boundary concept has thus stra-
tegically focused on the dimension of justiication. In con-
trast, the challenges posed by shared and social values to 
instrumental values are not resolved by developing a non-
instrumental concept, but by pointing to the importance of 
the collective level, understanding the intersubjectivity of 
values, and development of pluralistic boundary concepts 
and processes for sharing, aggregating and integrating val-
ues that are inclusive of multiple value justiications. As 
such, shared and social values, and relational values, are 
complementary constructs both essential for inclusive valu-
ation. Furthermore, the two are closely related; it is hard 
to imagine any relational values that are not in one dimen-
sion or another shared or social (Ishihara 2018), and rela-
tionships with nature and place are central in environmen-
tal social value formation processes (Kenter 2016a; Ranger 
et al. 2016; Edwards et al. 2016; Ainsworth et al. 2019; 
Calcagni et al. 2019; Gould et al. 2019).
An altogether diferent approach to inclusively communi-
cating values is presented by O’Connor and Kenter (2019), 
who build on O’Neill et  al. (2008) to develop the Life 
Framework of Value, which moves beyond value justiica-
tions to consider valuation in terms of diferent frames. Here, 
values are presented simply as what matters, and in relation 
to the environment this can be framed as living from, with, 
in and as the world (Fig. 4). Living from relects the value 
of the world as a resource, providing for our sustenance and 
livelihoods. Living in the world points to its role as place, 
as the stage for our lives. Living with the world points to 
non-human nature as the other, with whom we co-exist, and 
which has its own purposes, patterns and cycles. Living as 
the world points to more-than-human nature as self, with 
nature and non-humans constitutive of our bodies, psyche 
Fig. 4  The Life Value Framework, and the relation between its four 
frames and instrumental, relational and intrinsic value justiications 
(adapted from O’Connor and Kenter 2019). ES ecosystem services, 
NCP nature’s contributions to people
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and spirit individually and collectively, through for exam-
ple kinship, embodiment, and non-dual spiritual experience 
(O’Connor and Kenter 2019).
Importantly, while relational values may be particularly 
associated with living in and as frames, and intrinsic and 
instrumental values with  the with and from frames, the 
diferent justiications straddle the frames, pointing to the 
entwinement of multiple ethical categories in our common 
experience. For example, a farmer clearing forest for shift-
ing cultivation may be seen through a living from frame, but 
his livelihood is also likely to be the source of meaningful, 
non-substitutable relational values, and his clearing activi-
ties could support the intrinsic good of biodiversity (e.g. 
Bayliss-Smith et al. 2003). The authors note that “O’Neill’s 
way of phrasing values in relation to ‘living’ intuitively 
imbues a sense of egalitarianism between diferent values” 
and “its elegance incites a natural inclination towards includ-
ing each of the categories [in valuations and decision-mak-
ing]” (p. × 2). Diferentiating between value frames may be 
an easier way of communicating nature’s values to a broad 
audience than through more abstract value justiications.
However, further research and debate is needed to bet-
ter align the need to communicate values efectively in a 
way that resonates with citizens and policy makers, such as 
through the Life Framework and relational values, with rig-
orous explanation of the relationships between diferent cat-
egories. Further, research is needed that builds on discourses 
and approaches associated with shared and social values to 
ind ways of resolving practical tensions in sustainability 
practice between diferent value justiications and frames, 
enabling more efective value integration.
Value integration and rationalities
Diferent forms of value integration were presented in this 
Special Feature. Papers examined the integration of diferent 
types of values, including for example across diferent scales 
of values (van Riper et al. 2019) and provider (Kendal and 
Raymond 2019; Fordham and Robinson 2019) and across 
diferent value justiications (Christie et al. 2019b; O’Connor 
and Kenter 2019; Kronenberg and Andersson 2019). Inte-
gration becomes more complex when aligning between 
epistemic lenses that difer in terms of abstractness and 
constructedness (Rawluk et al. 2019), for example between 
values that are lived or embodied, where value is seen as 
dynamically situated (Raymond et al. 2017) and more objec-
tive approaches where values are seen as stable across situa-
tions. Such questions point to an urgent need to consider new 
forms of value integration. Gunton et al. (2017) argued that 
we need value frameworks that can integrate the place of 
interest and the scale and subject of interest. They proposed 
a suite of considerations for valuing ecosystems (e.g. social, 
economic, aesthetic, jural, sensory, symbolic), to be com-
pared with diferent stakeholder groups and across diferent 
types of places. These frameworks point to the diference 
between concept and method integration (Kronenberg and 
Andersson 2019; Guerrero et al. 2018), although arguably 
method integration needs to be underpinned by conceptual 
integration, at least if one wishes to avoid unconscious prag-
matism where no attention is given to how tensions along 
diferent lenses are resolved (Raymond et al. 2014). Most 
social values for sustainability papers do not discuss the 
interface between conceptual and methodological integra-
tion, and this is an important avenue for future research.
Value integration can achieve diferent levels or purposes. 
Kronenberg and Andersson (2019) distinguished full inte-
gration through a single measure, comparison of results from 
selected combinations of methods, and parallel use where 
there are multiple diicult to compare sets of values. The 
level of value integration achievable will depend on the 
degree to which values and value dimensions are deemed 
logically and axiologically commensurable and value indica-
tors and valuation methods technically compatible.
Diferent integration levels tend to be informed by dif-
ferent epistemic lens perspectives, including with regard to 
rationality. Full integration and its demands for commensu-
rability is strongly tied to instrumental rationality (Lock-
wood 2005). Here the focus is on the choice of suitable indi-
cators where diferent values are traded-of in the search for 
an optimal outcome. Values are treated as commensurable 
by looking to measure them according to a common scale 
and thus aggregated into a single value indicator, such as 
through monetisation and many forms of multi-criteria 
analysis. More limited combination approaches can be 
linked with bounded rationality, where doing well enough 
rather than optimising choices is inevitable in many contexts 
(Simon 1984). Here, incommensurable values may be com-
pared ordinally or nominally (e.g. improvement vs degrada-
tion). Values from diferent methods can also be brought 
together on the basis of communicative rationality, where 
values are weighted on the basis of the force of argument 
rather than analytical criteria, and the realisation of ideals 
of non-coercion and inclusivity determines to what degree 
outcomes are rational (Habermas 1984). Here, plural val-
ues may be thought of as weakly comparable, which means 
they should only be compared in terms of practical judge-
ment, rather than on a common scale (Martínez-Alier et al. 
1998). For example, O’Connor and Kenter (2019) propose 
the integration of intrinsic, instrumental and relational val-
ues through discussion structured according to the multi-
ple Life Frames, where people are invited to relect on how 
diferent policy scenarios might afect both people and the 
more-than-human world. Irvine et al. (2016), Kenter (2016a) 
and Ravenscroft (2019) point out philosophical challenges 
around deliberative value integration, relating to how much 
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diferent representations and value criteria count, and urging 
further empirical investigation of how deliberative valua-
tions can act as new democratic spaces for integration based 
on social learning and communicative rationality.
Given these diferent value integration rationalities, how 
can policymakers recognise the diverse values of nature? 
Here, we need to accept the rationality of ‘value pluralism’ 
in that value diversity is an outcome itself. Diverse authors 
(e.g. Larmore 1987; Kekes 1993) have argued that con-
licts between values are not always resolvable. The notion 
of moral conlict (Stocker 1990) suggests that ethics need 
not always be action guiding. Instead, respecting plurality 
involves recognition of diverse pathways of policy formation 
and implementation. This will require a shift in the culture of 
policy making and associated capacity building to promote 
awareness of diverse value traditions and practice in grap-
pling with multiple value lenses and meta-lenses. In terms 
of deliberation, the principal outcome sought may not be 
the kind of consensus solutions associated with Haberma-
sian ideals, but providing a forum for plurality, capacity and 
trust-building. Furthermore, even where values cannot be 
agreed, it may still be possible to agree on shared meta-val-
ues around how to deal with divergent or conlicting values 
and lenses.
Values, conlict and power
The consideration of plural values and the challenges of 
integrating them with each other and into decisions raises 
key questions of power in navigating such conlicts. Despite 
real consequences, the interplay between values and power 
continue to be neglected, especially in empirical valuation 
studies. This is in part due to the multifaceted nature of 
both values and power. Power can be both overt and almost 
imperceptible and exercised through hegemonically privileg-
ing certain lenses and meta-lenses (Foucault 1980; Lukes 
2005). Power dynamics can inluence whose values are 
expressed or recognised, and which values emerge in con-
texts, though this is not necessarily transparent. Research-
ers and practitioners of sustainability science must become 
attuned to recognising and navigating power as expressed 
through values and the lenses by which we examine them.
The interplay between social values and power can occur 
in many ways. A dominant scientiic framing of sustain-
ability privileges one way of knowing, which can depoliti-
cise inherently political challenges (Sletto 2008). Exam-
ples include the concepts of the Anthropocene (Haraway 
et al. 2015) and sustainability itself (Ferreira 2017), which 
homogenise social drivers apolitically. Consciously or 
unconsciously privileging one set of social value lenses over 
others can manifest in social–ecological injustices (Collard 
et al. 2018). Certain values (e.g. economic, moral, religious, 
scientiic, etc.) of particular groups (e.g. diferent social 
classes) will be favoured in policy and decision-making 
through exercise of power, for example through privileging 
of economic value above all else (Demaria 2010). In con-
trast, lenses and languages of valuation, and consequently 
values, associated with indigenous and local knowledge sys-
tems are often ignored in decision-making (Martinez-Alier 
2009; Christie et al. 2019b). Further, meta-values encapsu-
lated in dominant lenses, including ideas of social memory 
and how the future should be (Rawluk and Curtis 2016), 
can cause people to silence values that don’t match expec-
tations, including in deliberative processes (Orchard-Webb 
et al. 2016; Lo and Spash 2012).
There are many ways in which power can be exer-
cised in order to direct, control or regulate the conduct 
of people, in overt and subtle ways (Foucault and Rabi-
now 1997), for example, through discursive strategies of 
power–knowledge embedded in diferent ‘governmen-
talities’, such as Sovereignty, Discipline, Neoliberalism 
and Truth, as an art of government (Foucault et al. 2008). 
According to diferent technologies of power exerted in a 
historical context, these governmentalities afect the val-
ues that people are able to adopt in their lives. Given that 
values are crucial aspects of the choices, decisions, and 
behaviours of people related to sustainability, the interplay 
between how power is exercised, the values that people 
adopt, and the construction of individuals’ identities is key 
to understand environmental governance and its outcomes 
(Agrawal et al. 2005; D’Alisa and Kallis 2016).
While ontological and epistemological diferences can 
be a source of contestation (Rawluk et al. 2019), tensions 
around power inevitably arise in relation to any form of 
social values assessment in practice, though are often not 
acknowledged. In particular, there is a need for more atten-
tion to power relations in diverse processes of value forma-
tion, socialisation and internalisation, such as by Calcagni 
et al. (2019) who consider the impact of communication 
and market strategies inluencing value creation on social 
media. Even in deliberative value formation character-
ised by ideals of non-coercive communicative rationality, 
such ideals can only be approximated, as in the real-world, 
unconscious power relations cannot be fully ironed out 
(Orchard-Webb et al. 2016; Kadlec and Friedman 2007). 
Intractable controversies inevitably remain, demand-
ing speciic, contextual answers at the level of practice 
(Pellizzoni 2001). Further, in sustainability practice, an 
important barrier for realising pro-sustainability social 
values are people’s limited power and control to change 
their unsustainable practices resulting from unmet wellbe-
ing-related needs (Brear and Mbonane 2019; Huxley and 
Yiftachel 2000).
Thus, sustainability that manifests social–ecological 
justice requires centring on both social values and power. 
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If other-regarding transcendental values that underpin 
the ethos of sustainability, such as equity, generosity and 
care, are to be promoted, there is a precursory requirement 
to transparently observe diversities of values and needs 
alongside privileging mechanisms of power. In the ield of 
valuation, scholars may need to become more comfortable 
with relational and post-structuralist meta-lenses, since 
power is observed more easily through these (Foucault 
1980). In line with Geels et al. (2017), Smith et al. (2005) 
and Everard et  al. (2016), considering values through 
multiple value, epistemic and procedural lenses is critical 
because socio-technical transition pathways towards sus-
tainable systems imply necessarily value-oriented govern-
ance systems, which are afected by the interplays between 
technologies of power, the institutional system, and the 
processes of pro-sustainability value socialisation.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered key theoretical and prac-
tical tensions in the burgeoning ield of social values of 
sustainability. These tensions relate to important dimen-
sions of values that characterise the lenses and epistemic 
and procedural meta-lenses through which diferent tradi-
tions conceive and perceive these values. Key avenues for 
future research relating to these tensions include:
 1. Exploration of relations between collective and indi-
vidual values, and the dynamic internalisation and 
socialisation processes by which values transfer up and 
down between individuals and multiple social scales of 
value provider;
 2. Investigation of crisis-triggers for pro-sustainability 
value-change and levers for ‘rippling out’ changes;
 3. Conceptual development and empirical exploration of 
proto-values;
 4. Application of interventions based on value awareness, 
activation and congruence within sustainability con-
texts and their upscaling from individualistic to social;
 5. Evaluation of values-based interventions that take a 
generalised vs place-based perspective;
 6. Further development of the Life Framework as a novel 
way of organising and communicating why the natural 
world matters;
 7. The interface between value, conceptual and methodo-
logical pluralism, value integration and comparative 
and combined use of multiple rationalities for valua-
tion;
 8. Deliberative mechanisms to address conlicts between 
values at diferent spatiotemporal and social scales, 
between diferent value justiications and Life Frames 
and between diferent value and epistemic lenses;
 9. More explicit evaluations of recognition and proce-
dural justice in critical social valuation, and under 
which conditions transformative objectives of social 
valuations are met;
 10. The interplay between how power is exercised and the 
values that people adopt across diferent institutions 
and contexts;
 11. The development of new languages of valuation that 
are better relective of relational, constructivist and 
poststructuralist perspectives;
 12. Understanding mechanisms whereby certain lenses are 
privileged over others in diferent decision-contexts, 
and capacity building for understanding and drawing 
on multiple value, epistemic and procedural lenses in 
decision-making.
The large number of dimensions of values to which these 
questions point relect that sustainability issues are by and 
large complex and wicked problems. Addressing such issues 
requires us to navigate transcendental and contextual values 
at multiple spatiotemporal scales, between individuals and 
collectives, across diferent potentially conlicting value jus-
tiications, frames and rationalities, and with close attention 
to power relations in such conlicts, both within and between 
diferent value articulating institutions. Efective navigation 
requires charts, beacons and experience. This paper has 
sought to scout the terrain providing a multidimensional 
interpretation of the messy social values landscape. Such 
a map is crucial in communicating with fellow travellers 
where one is, in the sense of what values one is articulating 
and from which vantage point. Understanding of tensions 
provides beacons to shed light on crucial areas of conlict, 
where we need to pay particular attention in our journeys of 
sustainability science and practice. At these points, experi-
ence of engaging not just with the landscape and its map 
but with fellow travellers becomes vital, as the terrain is 
too challenging for any tradition to tackle on its own. Cru-
cially, all values around sustainability have a social dimen-
sion. A juxtaposition between individual instrumental values 
and social, shared, cultural, non-instrumental or relational 
values is thus not helpful—rather we must help each other 
understand what dimensions of the value landscape we are 
viewing and through what lens. At these junctions, by lov-
ing the mess and enjoying the thrill of exploration, conlict 
can become a space of creative dynamism where new con-
cepts, methods and approaches can be born. The mess does 
not need resolving but engaging with. This requires build-
ing capacity with researchers and practitioners: learning to 
navigate and learning to love, by embracing the plurality of 
how we conceive and articulate values in research, decision 
mechanisms and boundary spaces—all are ultimately social 
processes of valuation.
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